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Abstract 
New drug epidemics often unleash punitive campaigns to end them- highlighted 
by the 1980’s drug wars. However, the opioid crisis has been met with public-health 
driven policies, like clean needle programs and community-based substance abuse 
therapy. This thesis asks why policy responses to the opioid crisis are so different than 
those of the War on Drugs.   
First, as the cost of the drug war became clearer, policy makers across the 
political spectrum became less inclined to wage a new punitive war against opioids, 
especially as public-health responses proved to be more effective while also less costly. 
Second, the demographics of those addicted to opioids is different than those who 
were addicted to crack cocaine. The brunt of War on Drugs policies was felt by those in 
the lowest socioeconomic brackets and perpetuated poverty in low-income communities. 
Today’s softer approaches have been informed by a greater percentage of middle- to 
upper-class individuals affected by the opioid crisis. 
Third, as opioids have legitimate medical purposes, they are harder to demonize 
or ban, rendering it more difficult to declare total war against them. Further, the influence 
opioid manufacturers have has made policy makers less inclined to declare war, taking 
supply-side action. 
Public-health driven policies and policies that minimize supply-side action against 
pharmaceutical opioid manufacturers are duplicate representations of the United States’ 
departure from War on Drug tactics. As long as the “medical model” of health care, 
which emphasizes drugs, medical treatment, and surgery is ingrained in society and the 
economy, these patterns will continue.  
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Introduction 
 
Formally declared by President Richard Nixon in 1971, the War on Drugs is 
commonly referred to as “America’s longest war.” Spanning a number of decades, the 
tough-on-crime drug policies that characterized the War on Drugs caused irreparable 
harm that was by no means parallel to the harm that could be ascribed to drug use. The 
War on Drugs failed to minimize drug use, nor did it address the problems that 
accompany drug addiction. It also exhausted billions of tax dollars through heightened 
law enforcement and the expansion of the prison complex without creating any justifiable 
results.  
Policing during the War on Drugs was disproportionately done in low-income 
urban communities, despite the common knowledge that drug use is significantly higher 
in middle- to upper-class communities. Drug charges were extremely stringent, as low-
level offenders were charged with lengthy sentences and punishment were often 
equivalent to that designated to violent offenders. Without adequate resources in low-
income communities, defendants were left underrepresented by public defenders and 
susceptible to unfair plea bargains. Prisons became overcrowded by citizens who were 
unable to afford legal resources and the treatments and medicine necessary address 
addiction and mental illness- given the tremendously high cost of healthcare. Jails and 
prisons therefore became the holding grounds for low-income mentally disabled men and 
women for this reason. 
Further, upon being released, offenders faced obstacles impeding them from 
securing welfare, employment, healthcare, and voting rights. When sentenced for a drug 
charge, low-level offenders were simultaneously sentenced to a life of poverty and 
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misfortune. A report by the United Nations concluded: “Getting drug policy right is not a 
matter of theoretical or intellectual debate- it is one of the key policy challenges of our 
time.”1 
At the same time that President Clinton was ramping up the War on Drugs in the 
1990’s, the media was flooded by pharmaceutical advertisements for any potential 
ailment. Thus, a strange new tension was born: a righteous movement against illicit drug 
use increasingly coexists with a more tolerant, even pro-drug pharmaceutical industry.  
 Today’s opioid crisis is point in case. Even though illicit heroin and fentanyl are 
responsible for overdose deaths at a greater frequency than prescribed opioids, licit 
prescription drugs like OxyContin are responsible for one-third of opioid-related 
overdose deaths. These prescribed narcotics are often the first opioid a victim has used 
before developing a dependency.2  
Today, over 40 Americans die from an opioid overdose a day.3 To address this, 
action has been necessary by all accounts. A number of policies have been implemented 
that emphasize public health over incarceration. Examples include diversion programs, 
community-based substance abuse therapy and vocational training to prepare for 
reentering their communities. This ideological and bureaucratic shift is welcomed for a 
myriad of reasons, as it is more cost effective, has reduced rates of recidivism and 
                                                     
1 Boggs, C. (2016). Drugs, Power, and Politics: Narco Wars, Big Pharma, and the Subversion of 
Democracy. London and New York: Routledge. 
2 Thompson, D. (2019, January 18). Big Pharma's Marketing to Docs Helped Trigger Opioid Crisis: Study. 
Retrieved from https://consumer.healthday.com/bone-and-joint-information-4/opioids-990/big-pharma-s-
marketing-to-docs-helped-trigger-opioid-crisis-study-741705.html 
3 Derse, A. (2016). The Opioid Epidemic: New policies, Treatments, Non-opioid Alternatives. Atlanta, GA: 
AHC Media. 
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addiction in former offenders, and reflects moral considerations that were absent for so 
much of the War on Drugs.  
The inherent dissimilarities between the War on Drugs and policy responses to the 
opioid crisis are marked. This thesis seeks to answer why policy responses to the opioid 
crisis are so different than those of the War on Drugs.  
First, as the cost of the drug war became clearer, policy makers across the 
political spectrum became less inclined to wage a new punitive war against opioids, 
especially as public-health responses proved to be more effective while also less costly. 
Second, the demographics of those addicted to opioids is different than those who 
were addicted to crack cocaine. The brunt of War on Drugs policies was felt by those in 
the lowest socioeconomic brackets and perpetuated poverty in low-income communities. 
Today’s softer approaches have been informed by a greater percentage of middle- to 
upper-class individuals affected by the opioid crisis. 
Not only has the United States moved away from War on Drugs policies used to 
address drug use, it has also moved away from tactics used for supply-side enforcement. 
In particular, drug policies today reflect regulatory and disciplinary leniency towards the 
pharmaceutical companies that manufacture licit opioids, directly defying the 
bureaucratic aim to minimize drug use and addiction.  
As this thesis seeks to answer why policy responses to the opioid crisis are so 
different than those of the War on Drugs, it must also address why supply-side 
enforcement during the opioid crisis looks so different than that of the War on Drugs.  
While there are striking parallels to the tactics used by the pharmaceutical 
companies that manufacture licit opioids and illicit drug dealers, these corporations have 
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sway over the American bureaucracy, affording them the authority to influence 
regulatory and legislative policies. It is this influence that has made supply-side responses 
so different during the opioid crisis than those of the War on Drugs.  
Supply-side enforcement against drug dealers during the War on Drugs targeted 
those in low-income urban communities and resulted in incarceration. In contrast, even 
though pharmaceutical companies like Purdue Pharma have been charged with fines, they 
are slight in comparison to annual profits and simply considered a price of doing 
business.  
First, I will shed light on drug policies of past and present. What was once 
regulated, legally manufactured, and used for medicinal purposes eventually became 
criminalized and morally sensationalized. The lax drug policies of centuries past are often 
obscured by the history of the aggressive criminal enforcement of the War on Drugs. 
Representing this aggressive enforcement are the hundred-to-one sentencing ratio and the 
mandatory minimum sentencing policies, product of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 
and 1988.  
Since then, policies like the First Step Act have been made with the intention to 
rectify problems that followed these policies. Beyond addressing penal policy, the First 
Step Act also implemented a number of therapy-based programs. I will then explore the 
role different federal agencies have played in facilitating similar programming. The 
Health Resources and Service Administration, Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Service Administration, Department for Health and Human Services, and the Center for 
Disease Control have all been instrumental in providing medication-assisted treatment 
and using proactive measures to combat the epidemic. 
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After reviewing this history, it became clear that tough-on-crime policies created 
more problems than they addressed, while public health driven policies have proven to be 
effective.   
I argue that as we learned from the mistakes of the War on Drugs, the United 
States has been able reconcile traditionally liberal ideals of therapy-based programming 
with more conservative notions about incarceration. Approaches used to determine the 
costs and benefits of mass incarceration have explicitly demonstrated the enduring costs 
(both human and economic) of the War on Drugs. For this reason, lawmakers have been 
more inclined to move towards therapy-based treatment over the more costly route of 
incarceration.  
Many realities of mass incarceration and the War on Drugs have been apparent 
for decades, like the incompatibility between War on Drugs supply-side enforcement and 
demand for drug use (as drug prices have proven to be inelastic.) What is different now is 
a greater inclination to acknowledge these realities, as the political context has shifted. 
Tough-on-crime policies do not reap the same electoral benefits that they did in decades 
prior.  
While once posed as an issue of survival, crime became less salient of a political 
issue as crime rates rapidly decreased throughout the 1990s. For this reason, Americans 
were less worried about crime and punishment and therefore, less concerned with 
continuing tough-on-crime policies used during the War on Drugs. An additional 
explanation is that terrorism took precedence as America’s greatest concern following 
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9/11. Congressional hearings regarding crime reached their height in 1996 and nosedived 
by 2002.4 
Now, healthcare centric policies reap the electoral benefits that tough-on crime 
policies did in decades past. The issue voters identified as the most pressing during the 
2018 midterm elections was healthcare, more so than similarly emphasized issues like the 
economy, immigration, or gun policy. 80% of voters described healthcare as “extremely” 
or “very important” to their vote.5 
Today’s softer approaches have been informed by a greater percentage of middle- 
to upper-class individuals affected by the opioid crisis. This is a demographic more active 
in politics and advocacy, and one that’s voices are more often heard. The brunt of War on 
Drugs policies was felt by those in the lowest socioeconomic brackets and perpetuated 
poverty in low-income communities. During the War on Drugs, many voices were 
unheard from behind bars. Advocacy responses and policy changes today prompted by 
the opioid epidemic are reflective of the propensity to value certain constituents’ voices 
over others. This thesis will shed light on the social context that inspires policy-making- 
namely, how different demographics benefit or are damaged product of these policies.  
I will continue the discussion of how economic resources inform enforcement and 
policy responses. This is a story of political influence, as today’s drug dealers have 
bureaucratic influence. Instead of discussing this on the individual level, this dialogue will 
expand to include the corporations who are complicit in the opioid epidemic. With 
                                                     
4 Teles, S. M., & Dagan, D. (2016). Prison Break: Why Conservatives Turned Against Mass Incarceration. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
5 Newport, F. (2018, November 02). Top Issues for Voters: Healthcare, Economy, Immigration. Retrieved 
from https://news.gallup.com/poll/244367/top-issues-voters-healthcare-economy-immigration.aspx 
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astronomical profits that afford great influence and clout, the pharmaceutical companies 
who manufacture highly addictive opioids are able to elude significant punishment. While 
these companies use eerily similar tactics to black market drug dealers, the licit nature of 
pharmaceuticals and the role of the healthcare complex adds an additional dimension for 
consideration.   
To close, I will evaluate whether the War on Drugs as we know it has come to an 
end, whether the policies used to combat the opioid crisis are sustainable, and what is 
next to come regarding drug policies.  
This thesis concludes that while incompatible on the surface level, lenient policies 
towards drug users and towards pharmaceutical companies both reflect how the 
medicalization of American society has influenced the departure from the War on Drugs. 
The “medical model” of health care, which emphasizes drugs, medical treatment, and 
surgery is ingrained in society and the economy. It is this medical model that can explain 
the prominence and profits pharmaceutical companies gained. It further points to why the 
instinctual response now is to remedy issues of addiction through public-health tactics. 
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Chapter 1: Drug Policies Past and Present 
 Criminal enforcement of drug use is an invention of the twentieth century. What 
was once regulated, legally manufactured, and used for medicinal purposes eventually 
became criminalized and morally sensationalized. The lax drug policies of centuries past 
are often obscured by the history of the aggressive criminal enforcement of the War on 
Drugs.  
 This chapter will trace the drug policies that characterized the last hundred years- 
from regulatory regimes at the beginning of the twentieth century, to aggressive criminal 
enforcement during the War on Drugs, to public health centric policies implemented 
during the opioid crisis. These regimes differ in form and stringency- evidencing the 
ever-shifting nature of ideologies and the policies that follow. Through examining a 
number of drug policies, this chapter’s main aim is to contextualize what has prompted 
the shift from War on Drug policies to those of the opioid crisis.   
 Inconceivable today, heroin, morphine, and other opioids were legally sanctioned 
medical treatments for many years. As one doctor said during World War II, opiates 
provided “the most blessed controller of pain and shock produced by God and discovered 
by man.”6 Not only was the medicinal use of these drugs sanctioned, but so was the sale 
of such. The Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914 regulated opioids, cocaine, and 
marijuana. Those who handled these drugs were required to indicate such to the 
Department of Internal Revenue, acquire a tax “stamp,” and thoroughly note the 
proceedings that followed as they brought the drugs to market. Licit drug-related business 
ventures also were required to complete a monthly narcotic report that was shared by the 
                                                     
6 Frydl, K. (2013). The Drug Wars in America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Department of International Revenue with the Bureau of Narcotics within the Department 
of Treasury.7 The financial accountability that occurred with registration and transparent 
communication with federal agencies mirrored that of any other business venture. 
In the years between the end of World War II and President Nixon’s formal 
proclamation of a “War on Drugs” in 1971, the United States evolved from a regulatory 
system into a restrictive and penal one. Some presume that the mandatory minimum 
prison terms were the product of the War on Drugs, as this sentencing protocol was one 
of the most commonly recognized (and maligned) War on Drugs policy. While it was in 
this period that mandatory minimums became a staple of tough-on-crime practices, 
mandatory minimums were introduced and used by the government as early as the 
1950s.8   
 Following World War II, lawmakers focused their efforts on illegal drugs, but 
only towards particular operations. Preliminarily, police sought out corrupt metropolitan 
vice squads and Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents. As years passed, lawmakers’ 
concern for disciplinary drug enforcement grew. Sociologist James Whitman cites this 
greater concern as being the “paradoxical result of the absence of aristocracy and a 
modern penchant for populist crusades.” Alternatively, academic Jonathon Simon chalks 
this to “the broad episteme or body of ideas shaping the modern understanding of 
punishment, including the critical discursive, political, and disciplinary moments that 
enabled a punitive paradigm to emerge as a structuring frame of governance.”9  
                                                     
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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 By the time that Nixon proclaimed his “War on Drugs,” police were able to 
glance at an illegal drug and quickly identify it, which was untrue only twenty years 
prior. Now police regularly took into custody individuals for drug violations. Beyond 
policing for mere drug possession, police began to use this as a means and justification to 
police, especially in low-income metropolitan areas.10  
 The War on Drugs marked the beginning of a new era, characterized by tough-on-
crime policies. Two of the most damning and prominent policies of the War on Drugs 
included the hundred-to-one sentencing ratio and the aforementioned mandatory 
minimum sentencing.  
Implemented through the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, the hundred-
to-one sentencing ratio inflicted considerably harsher penalties for those arrested for 
crack cocaine offenses than for those arrested for powder cocaine offenses. Per this 
policy, individuals in possession of five grams of crack cocaine received the same 
minimum sentence as someone with 500 grams of powder cocaine.11 This policy was in 
many ways an attack on low-income urban communities, as crack cocaine is significantly 
cheaper than powder cocaine, thus used with greater frequency in these communities.  
Beyond the hundred-to-one sentencing ratio, the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 
and 1988 allowed sentencing measures to reach even greater extremes, with the 
intensification of mandatory minimum sentencing. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
required a minimum sentence of five years for offenses that included 5 grams of crack, 
                                                     
10 Ibid. 
11 U.S. Supreme Court Weighs 100-to-1 Disparity in Crack/Powder Cocaine Sentencing. (2007, October 2). 
Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/news/us-supreme-court-weighs-100-1-disparity-crackpowder-
cocaine-sentencing 
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500 grams of cocaine, 1 kilogram of heroin, 40 grams of a substance with fentanyl, 5 
grams of methamphetamine, or 100 kilograms or 100 plants of marijuana. Individuals 
were eligible for forty years for certain levels of drug possession and could even serve a 
life sentence for greater amounts.12  
Mandatory minimum sentencing stripped judges from their general authority to 
consider the circumstances of the crime as they relate to the defendant themselves when 
determining the sentence.13 For this reason, someone delivering drugs would receive the 
same punishment that one would if they were in control of the whole operation and were 
found with the same levels of possession.14  
Mandatory minimum sentencing transfers the normally held authority of a judge 
to the prosecutor. Prosecutors often are able to intimidate defendants with the threat of 
lengthy mandatory minimum sentences into pleading guilty for a reduced sentence. 
Sometimes, defendants will plead guilty for a reduced sentence, even when they did not 
commit the crime, in fear of the possibility of a mandatory sentence.15  
 Just as criminal enforcement of drugs is an invention of the twentieth century, so 
is the prison complex and the mass incarceration that followed. Between 1925 and 1973, 
state and federal prison populations remained exceptionally consistent. The prison 
population was 785,000 in 1965, but product of draconian sentencing measures grew to 
seven million in 2010. Crime rates skyrocketed by 135% from 1964 to 1968, which 
                                                     
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.cjpf.org/mandatory-
minimums 
15 Ibid. 
   17 
explains a greater emphasis on crime and punishment. However, crime rates began to 
drop within the next decade while intense policing and punishment remained.16  
 As bureaucratic attention centered towards drug enforcement and the prison 
complex, education, healthcare, and the welfare system were largely disregarded. 
Funding for welfare programs was reallocated towards law enforcement. There were 
institutional changes to welfare programs, such as President Clinton’s move to replace 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (ADFC) with Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF)- severely minimizing welfare benefits. Additional policies were 
implemented that restricted welfare access to drug offenders which perpetuated poverty 
and socio-economic disparities in these communities. Social programming that could aid 
those most negatively affected by the War on Drugs was underfunded and minimal, 
perpetuating drug use and crime in low income metropolitan areas.17  
At a time of great economic collapse in low-income urban communities, poverty 
became nearly inescapable. A lacking welfare state but massive and enduring prison 
system made it so that significant social change is reliant first on remedying the prison 
system and the policies that lead those to enter it.18 For this reason, softer approaches to 
drug use and crime that have accompanied the opioid epidemic are especially welcomed 
and appreciated.   
Examples of softer approaches include diversion programs instead of 
incarceration, community-based substance abuse therapy and vocational training to 
                                                     
16 Murakawa, N. (2014). The First Civil Right : How Liberals Built Prison America. [N.p.]: Oxford 
University Press. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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prepare for reentering their communities. A shift away from policies used during the War 
on Drugs towards these softer approaches has been noticeable on both the state and 
federal level. This shift has entailed a greater focus on public and community health and 
less of a reliance on the prison complex. Unlike War on Drug policies, responses to the 
opioid epidemic have proven to reduce rates of recidivism and addiction in drug users.  
Minimizing punishment and extending treatment to those who suffer from 
addiction is action on drug markets’ consumer-side. This softening can be seen as 
beneficial to communities and the country at large. In contrast, actions leading to and in 
response to the opioid epidemic addressing the drug market’s supply-side have been 
highly destructive.  
Greater leniency from governmental agencies like the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), who are responsible for 
macro-level enforcement and intimate ties with presidential administrations, the federal 
legislative branch, and state governments has allowed for less regulation and minimal 
consequences to the supply-side actors in the opioid crisis. This stands stark contrast to 
the action taken against supply-side actors in decades past- those selling on street corners 
instead of in corporate medical complexes.  
For the remainder of this chapter, I will call to attention policies relating to the 
opioid crisis that exemplify a departure from War on Drug policies. The softening of 
sentencing policies and the public health initiatives that have followed the onset of the 
opioid crisis represent a more sympathetic response to drug-use and addiction. Drug 
policies that reflect regulatory and disciplinary leniency for the Big Pharma companies 
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who have played a role in facilitation the opioid crisis embody the extent of corporate 
influence over the bureaucracy.  
All policies represent how addiction and crime have been reframed during the 
twenty-first century following the uncompromising War on Drugs that characterized the 
latter half of the twentieth century. Further, these policies both reflect why the 
medicalization of American society has influenced the departure from War on Drug 
policies.  
To first consider are how sentencing policies have changed since the War on 
Drugs. Congress approved the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010, which minimized the 
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine convictions. What was once 
hundred-to-one became eighteen-to-one. The effort was largely bipartisan and is part of a 
trend of federal level initiatives intended to lessen racial and socio-economic disparities. 
As the disparity between crack and powder cocaine still exists, the system is by no means 
fully remedied. However, this is a positive step in the right direction.19 
The Fair Sentencing Act per the U.S. Sentencing Commission has also allowed 
for those convicted of crack cocaine felonies before the act’s implementation to appear in 
front of a federal judge who can reevaluate and potentially lessen the sentence. A positive 
move in the right direction, but not a complete remedy, as the offenders are still bound by 
pre-Fair Sentencing Act mandatory minimums.20  
Following the Fair Sentencing Act, The First Step Act was implemented to build 
upon the Fair Sentencing Act’s successes. The intention of the First Step Act was to 
                                                     
19 Fair Sentencing Act. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/drug-law-
reform/fair-sentencing-act 
20 Ibid. 
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rectify overwhelming mass incarceration in the United States. The First Step Act abridges 
mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug charges. It also lessens the federal 
“three strikes” mandate, which levies a life sentence after a third drug offense. Over two-
thirds of federal prisoners who are serving life sentences are doing so after being arrested 
for a nonviolent offense. Now, the “three strikes” mandate has been reduced to a 25-year 
sentence. Most momentously, the First Step Act enlarges the “drug safety-valve,” which 
allows judges greater authority to diverge from mandatory minimums when ruling on 
nonviolent drug charges.21  
The First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act void, as the First Step Act now 
applies to a greater number of former offenders. The First Step Act now includes an 
additional 3,000 offenders charged with felonies related to crack who were not initially 
included in the benefits of the Fair Sentencing Act.22 
 The First Step Act also represents a pivot towards therapy-based programs and 
those that prepare offenders to successfully re-enter their communities. The legislation 
allows prisoners to spend up to ten days in halfway houses or in-home observation after 
every successful month spent in a rehabilitation program. Vocational and educational 
instruction are provided to ease transition for offenders and help to reduce rates of 
recidivism. The federal government has granted $375 million to these efforts. Lastly, 
churches and similar programs have better access to prisons to lead programs.23   
                                                     
21 Grawert, A., & Lau, T. (2019, January 04). How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law — and What 
Happens Next. Retrieved from https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-
what-happens-next.  
22 Ibid. 
23 George, J. (2018, November 16). What's Really in the First Step Act? Retrieved from 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/16/what-s-really-in-the-first-step-act 
   21 
After initial resistance from a small group of staunchly conservative Senate 
Republicans, the bill was approved towards the end of 2018. Following endorsements and 
compromises led by Republican Senator Ted Cruz, the final bill passed with an 87-12 
margin. Notably, all Democrats voted for the bill. Then-House Speaker Paul Ryan sent 
the bill through the House with great speed, then quickly sent it to President Trump who 
was in favor of the legislation for a long time. Republican Senator and President pro 
temporare Chuck Grassley and the Koch Brothers, influential conservative donors and 
political activists were similarly supportive the legislation.24 Approval from a Republican 
president, Republican majority senate, and the country’s predominant conservative 
benefactors in itself is evidence that the country has moved away from War on Drug 
policies and ideologies- as the Republican party was once heavily entrenched in its 
tough-on-crime attitudes.  
 The First Step Act is the most sizeable effort on the federal level to abet mass 
incarceration and demonstrates a bipartisan trend of prison and drug reform. Now 
regarded as “Trump’s criminal justice bill,” the First Step Act can now be regarded as a 
precedent for additional reform for Republicans looking to follow Trump’s example. The 
First Step Act is not perfect, as there are still notable mandatory-minimums and two of 
the major sentencing stipulations are not retroactive, lessening the act’s scope. For this 
reason, Democrats campaigning for the 2020 presidency now have an interesting 
opportunity to propose even stronger resolutions to cease max incarceration in contrast to 
Trump’s criminal justice bill.25  
                                                     
24 Grawert & Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law — and What Happens Next.  
25 Ibid. 
   22 
 The executive branch has the authority to set the agenda and key policy issues of 
the years they are in office. Some presidents have chosen to emphasize tough-on-crime 
policies, such as President Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. In contrast, healthcare reform 
was one of President Obama’s greatest priorities during his presidency. This is important 
to keep in mind when considering both the focus on public-health centric policies and 
scope of pharmaceutical influence, as the opioid crisis gained momentum and reached its 
height during the Obama presidency.  
          In response to the opioid crisis, Obama sanctioned the Comprehensive Addiction 
and Recovery Act (CARA,) a bipartisan initiative passed in 2016. CARA providing $500 
million to states for programming such as alternative therapies, treatments, and drug 
education. CARA authorized nurse practitioners and physician assistants to write 
prescriptions for addiction treatment medications. This is meaningful, as many nonprofit 
treatment centers do not have enough physicians to give care and prescriptions to 
everyone.26  
Not a specific response to the opioid crisis, but instrumental in providing the care 
necessary to combat opioid addiction and its repercussions is the Affordable Care Act. 
Colloquially referred to as “Obamacare,” the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was the Obama 
administration’s defining piece of legislation. The ACA was created with the aim of 
lowering the cost of healthcare, making health insurance more obtainable, and increasing 
the scope of Medicaid, and support innovative medical care designed to lower the cost of 
health care generally.27 When the ACA’s Title I, describes the ten “essential health 
                                                     
26 Derse, The Opioid Epidemic: New policies, Treatments, Non-opioid Alternatives. 
27 Affordable Care Act (ACA) - HealthCare.gov Glossary. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/affordable-care-act/ 
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benefits” that all health insurance policies must cover, “mental health and substance use 
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment” are included. There are 
significant financial burdens associated with addiction and many rely on Medicaid as a 
result.28  
The ACA is a broad piece of legislation that transformed healthcare services at 
large. As there was a disregard for the socioeconomic barriers to receiving adequate 
sufficient healthcare during the War on Drugs, the ACA is especially meaningful in 
providing healthcare at large and that targeted to treat addiction and its corollaries.  
Manifesting this move towards not only addressing drug use, but the additional 
health problems that follow, text from a Department of Health and Human Services HHS 
report is as follows:  
 
Opioid misuse and opioid use disorders have devastating effects. As we see all too 
often in cases of overdose deaths, lives end prematurely and tragically. Other 
serious consequences include neonatal abstinence syndrome and transmission of 
infectious diseases such as HIV and viral hepatitis, as well as compromised 
physical and mental health. Social consequences include loss of productivity, 
increased crime and violence, neglect of children, and expanded health care 
costs.29 
 
                                                     
28 Mcdonough, J. E. (2016). Behind the Bipartisan Kumbaya on Opioids and Drug Abuse. The Milbank 
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Public health approaches that take into consideration additional life-threatening 
diseases that follow drug use is just as important as addressing drug use itself. Injected 
drugs are highly correlated with the transmission of many blood-borne diseases, such as 
HIV/AIDS and hepatitis. While HIV diagnoses declined through the mid-1990s, they are 
now increasing in tandem to the opioid crisis. 10% of new HIV diagnoses are among 
those who inject drugs.30  
Clean needle programs have been implemented to address this. Clean needle 
programs decrease rates of blood-borne disease transmission like HIV/AIDS and do not 
increase rates of drug use. They also connect participants with medical and mental health 
services, housing programs, and case management, all at little to no cost.31  
Unlike during the War on Drugs, policies today take into consideration the 
complex nature of addiction and drug-use. Addiction takes much to overcome. Even 
when progress is made, relapses happen frequently. Clean needle programs are one 
manifestation of this. Another manifestation is the expansion of naloxone access.  
Naloxone is a medication that can reverse an opioid overdose. It can be injected 
or used as a nasal spray one to three hours following the opioid consumption. Good 
Samaritan Laws apply to in the majority of states- meaning that if an overdose occurs, 
there are no legal ramifications for drug possession. States differ on specifics of naloxone 
regulations, but the majority have allowed naloxone to be obtained without a patient-
specific prescription. Just as proven with clean needle programs, studies have indicated 
that expanding access naloxone does not increased rates of opioid use.32  
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Unlike policies during the War on Drugs, many policy responses to the opioid 
epidemic (such as expanding access to naloxone) are proactive in their nature. Beyond 
naloxone, proactive measures include using data analytics and research to determine an 
appropriate course of action; implementing prevention measures; and sponsoring 
educational programs for healthcare providers and communities at large.  
The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) has strengthened 
MAT and increased in scope the mental health and substance use disorder services that 
concentrate on treatment, prevention, and education on opioid abuse. HRSA has further 
worked to incorporate these programs into primary care. Since the beginning of 2017, 
more than 200 health centers have participated in HRSA-funded assistance programs 
through the Opioid Addiction Treatment Extension for Community Healthcare Outcomes 
project.33  
Since 2017, HHS has allocated over $2 billion in grants to support research and 
action against the opioid crisis. HHS has also joined forces with federal agencies as well 
as state and local governments. Also collaborating with HHS is the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Service Administration (SAMHSA) In a public statement, SAMHSA 
described its mission to:  
Increase access to evidence-based interventions- especially in communities 
hardest hit by the opioid crisis. We are (1) working with states and their 
communities to increase access to prevention, treatment and recovery support 
services for opioid use disorder; (2) supporting providers’ efforts to offer 
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specialized treatment to pregnant and postpartum women with opioid use disorder 
and their opioid-exposed infants; (3) promoting early intervention and treatment 
as healthier alternatives to detaining people with opioid addiction in our criminal 
justice systems; (4) and facilitating the expansion of telemedicine to deliver 
Medication-Assisted treatment (MAT) to people in need in rural communities and 
to enhance rural providers’ skills.34  
SAMHSA created Opioid State Targeted Response (STRA) grants, which are 
two-year plans sanctioned by the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 155-255). SAMHSA 
bestowed $485 million to states during the 2017 fiscal year, letting states concentrate on 
especially pressing issues, such as making treatment more accessible. Similarly, the 
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant (SABG), which was first created 
in 1992, is another source of funding for states. SABG represents 32% of state substance 
abuse funding. SABG is largely open-ended, allowing states to use funding to support 
their communities in the method most suited to their needs.35  
 SAMHSA additionally has a number of measures intended for bettering MAT 
programs. MAT proves to be successful but is severely underused. SAMHSA’s 
Medication Assisted Treatment for Prescription Drug and Opioid Addiction (MAT-
PDOA) program enables greater MAT access by giving grants to states most burdened by 
the opioid crisis. Twenty-two states use funding from MAT-PDOA. As of September 
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2017, SAMHSA had provided over $345 million worth of grants in the span of three 
years towards supplemental MAT-PDOA grants to six states.36 
 SAMHSA additionally works to educate a greater number of healthcare providers 
on how to provide opioid addiction treatment. This is of great importance, as studies 
suggest that 70% of doctors in the United States have failed tests of their understanding 
of drugs.37 Leading to the opioid epidemic, medical professionals overprescribed opioids 
in large part because of misconceptions regarding the severity of these drugs.  
In the span of four years since SAMHSA initiated its Provider’s Clinical Support 
System (PCSS)-MAT, over 62,000 healthcare providers have benefited from online or in-
person educational programs. (PCSS)-MAT is free of charge, initiates mentor programs 
with specialists, and grants healthcare providers with access to a library of evidence-
based practice materials.38  
SAMHSA finances MAT for populations most susceptible and at risk, like those 
within the criminal justice system.  20% of grant money given to SAMHSA’s participants 
within the criminal justice system can be used to acquire FDA-approved medicines to 
treat addiction. Since 2013, SAMHSA has documented steep growth in the amounts of 
drug courts including MAT in their programs. Today, 57% include MAT.39  
To better understand the extent of the epidemic and what methods of prevention 
and treatment prove to be the most successful, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
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facilitates data collection. For example, CDC’s Enhanced State Opioid Overdose 
Surveillance (ESOOS) program sponsors 32 states as well as Washington DC. ESOOS 
works to advance the speed at which both fatal and non-fatal opioid overdoses are 
reported, allowing for more acute public health responses. One of the most cutting-edge 
features of ESOOS is its use of emergency department and emergency medical services 
(EMS) data to follow and understand morbidity data. With this information, ESOOS 
implements early warning systems to catch drastic rises (like possible outbreaks) or drops 
(like effective intervention efforts) in overdoses.40  
 The CDC oversees epidemiological investigations (Epi-Aids) in states, aiding 
them when they are hit the hardest by the opioid crisis. As the War on Drugs proved in 
many ways that the federal government is not the most equipped governing body to 
handle drug-related policy, policy responses to the opioid crisis have allowed state and 
local governments greater authority. Collaboration between federal agencies like the 
CDC and states during the opioid crisis has proven to be effectual, as states can regard for 
specific considerations while having access to federal-level resources 
For example, from 2012 and 2015, Massachusetts noted a major escalation in 
opioid related deaths, from 698 to 1,747. Nearly 75% of these deaths were related to 
fentanyl. The Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) collaborated with the 
CDC to determine the role that illicitly-manufactured fentanyl (IMF) played in the 
increase of opioid-related deaths. The CDC joined forces with the MDPH, SAMHSA, 
and DEA to determine if fentanyl was being mixed with or sold as heroin, leading to the 
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increase in deaths. These organizations determined that 82% of fentanyl-related deaths 
were related to IMF.41  
In response to this discovery, the CDC suggested that MDPH instruct health care 
providers and law enforcement on overdose prevention, check up on at-risk communities 
for heroin or fentanyl use, and make naloxone more available. The CDC additionally 
created a specific course of action for Massachusetts- encouraging the state to reach out 
to those with past histories of opioid overdoses, substance abuse, or current users enrolled 
in programs to connect them with treatment or additional programs to inform them of 
fentanyl’s threats.42   
Beyond aiding states, the CDC educates law enforcement agencies, such as the 
DEA, so that on the federal level there is greater collaboration between public health 
focused agencies and enforcement agencies. An example of such is when the CDC 
worked with High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) directors to brainstorm 
tactics, coordinate training, aid public health analysts within the program, and advance 
performance.43  
Rather than arresting offenders, the DEA is cooperating with the CDC and other 
agencies in the name of public health. This stands in stark contrast to all the raids and 
arrests facilitated by the DEA during the War on Drugs. While greater sympathy from the 
DEA towards consumers is welcomed, they have grown notably laxer when enforcing the 
supply-side actors (Big Pharma) of today’s opioid epidemic.  
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This is highly contradictory- by allowing greater leeway to Big Pharma, more 
consumers get hooked on prescribed narcotics, often moving onto these licit drugs’ 
cheaper and illicit cousin, heroin. An unfortunate reality, the DEA’s leniency towards Big 
Pharma is the product of corporate influence over governing bodies. With this influence, 
Big Pharma corporations can protect profits in a blatant disregard for the health of its 
consumers.   
As this thesis seeks to answer why policy responses to the opioid crisis are so 
different than those of the War on Drugs, it must also address why supply-side 
enforcement during the opioid crisis looks so different than that of the War on Drugs.  
This is a story of political influence, as today’s drug dealers have bureaucratic influence. 
For example, in the same year that the opioid epidemic was labeled the most fatal 
drug epidemic to hit the United States, Congress implemented the Ensuring Patient 
Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act. This significantly hindered the DEA from 
taking action against pharmaceutical companies complicit in the illicit drug market of 
prescription opioids.44  
Before this policy’s implementation, drug distributors were penalized when 
completing questionable transactions for hundreds of millions of pills despite warnings 
from the DEA. These pills would go on to be sold by corrupt healthcare professionals on 
the black market. Despite this common recognition of where such questionable orders 
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would go, distributors would ignore the DEA’s warnings, given the resulting billions of 
dollars in sales.45  
The Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act inhibits the 
DEA from stopping questionable pharmaceutical shipments from the companies. Without 
this authority, the DEA does not have the same capability of stopping pharmaceuticals 
from entering the illicit market.46  
While the DEA was initially able to halt these efforts, the bill was eventually 
passed in 2016. Representative Tom Marino, who proposed the bill, accused the DEA of 
behaving toward pharmaceutical companies like they were “illicit narcotic cartels” when 
the bill was initially thwarted. Marino went on to describe “this mind-set [as] extremely 
dangerous to legitimate business.”  
It should be noted that Marino was initially nominated to be Trump’s drug czar 
but was required to remove himself from consideration given his role in pushing the 
Ensuring Patients Access and Efficient Drug Enforcement Act. As this position would 
have made Marino responsible with confronting the opioid epidemic, his financial ties 
and relationship to Big Pharma made him an inappropriate nominee by all accounts. 47  
Following the Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act, 
DEA action against physicians, pharmacies, and drug manufacturers declined. While 
there were 65 instances of suspended orders in 2011, this sum dropped to six by 2017.48  
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The bill was passed by general consent, a legislative mechanism used for bills that 
appear to be uncontroversial. Beyond the representatives who sponsored Ensuring Patient 
Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act and collaborated with pharmaceuticals in 
doing so, most representatives were unaware of the true nature of the law. Further, former 
senior administration officials to the Obama administration have remarked that the 
administration and the president were oblivious of the bill’s true meaning when 
sanctioning it.49  
Similar to the DEA, while the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is supposed 
to operate as a watch-dog agency over the drug industry, it has become a pawn to 
corporate interests result of institutional changes. When Congress implemented the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act, drug companies now began to pay FDA “user fees” for 
mandated testing, fees to accelerate permission to release drugs to market, which is often 
a complicated and drawn-out process. Drug companies now spent $310,000 for each 
application. These fees eventually accounted for half of the FDA budget, making the 
department reliant on the companies they were supposed to be monitoring.50  
Relationships between Big Pharma and federal enforcement and regulatory 
agencies have progressively mirrored that of two businesses cooperating.51 While there 
are merits to the increasing scope of the medical model (public health-driven response), a 
direct byproduct is the influence Big Pharma has garnered as a result. Greater leniency in 
drug policies towards both consumers and producers are duplicate representation of 
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societal attitudes towards addiction, the role of the prison complex, and corporate 
influence. 
The stringency of drug policy in the United States in the last century has 
continually fluctuated- from regulatory regimes at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
to aggressive criminal enforcement during the War on Drugs, to the public health centric 
policies that have characterized the last decade. Policymaking is multifaceted and while 
social considerations are of upmost importance, they do not represent the whole picture. 
The following chapter will detail the cost/benefit analyses and political considerations 
that further played a part in drug policy liberalization.   
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Chapter 2: Cost-Benefit Analyses and Political Considerations 
In 1986, Congressional representative Newt Gingrich yearned for a “decisive, all-
out effort to destroy the underground drug empire,” with hopes of World War II scale 
efforts. Twenty-five years later, Gingrich conceded that, “There is an urgent need to 
address the astronomical growth in the prison population, with its huge costs in dollars 
and lost human potential. The criminal-justice system is broken, and conservatives must 
lead the way in fixing it.”52 Both responses from Gingrich represent Republican 
ideologies- as he initially spoke to the party’s tough-on-crime stances, then eventually 
rooted notions on the criminal-justice system in the party’s typical anti-statist and fiscally 
conservative ideology.  
The stark contrast between Gingrich’s initial sentiments on the War on Drugs 
versus what he has expressed in recent years is evidentiary of the shift in War on Drugs 
attitudes. As Gingrich now acknowledges, the War on Drugs has had exorbitant costs. In 
this chapter, I will argue that as approaches used to determine the costs and benefits of 
mass incarceration have explicitly demonstrated the enduring costs (both human and 
economic) of the War on Drugs, lawmakers have been more inclined to move towards 
therapy-based treatment over the more costly route of incarceration.  
There is now a greater inclination to acknowledge the realities of mass 
incarceration and the War on Drug. While apparent for decades, policymakers now 
reconcile the departure from War on Drug tactics since the political context in the country 
has shifted, especially for the Republican party. Tough-on-crime policies do not reap the 
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same electoral benefits that they did in decades prior.  
  This chapter will first explore numerous cost-benefit analyses indicating the 
merits of therapy-based treatment and the failings of the prison complex. This chapter is 
driven by a quantitative analysis, rooting the merits justifying these shifts in policy in 
concrete numbers and data.  
To follow I will trace the declining salience of crime control as a political and 
electoral issue. To close, I will explore the economics of War on Drugs policies by 
considering governmental spending  
Discussions of the War on Drugs are intrinsically related to that of the prison 
complex, given the mass incarceration that followed heightened drug enforcement. The 
prison complex is the cumulation of thousands of local governments, 50 state systems, 
and a federal system. 57% of spending on the prison complex is done by state 
governments and 32% is done by local governments. The Prison Policy Initiative 
determined that $182 billion or more was spent on the prison complex annually, an 
astronomical sum.53 While the Republican party is defined anti-statist and fiscally 
conservative ideology, expenditures on the prison complex have been largely excluded 
from those ideological considerations.     
Massive spending was initially justified on the grounds of reducing societal ills. It 
could perhaps be easier to reconcile costly policies if they reaped the benefits intended, 
but these policies have proven to be ineffective in addressing addiction and recidivism in 
offenders. 
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In contrast, treatment programs have proven to decrease the social and economic 
cost of drug abuse with greater success than incarceration, as evidenced by cost-benefit 
analyses. Therapeutic programs focused on abetting the social costs associated with 
addiction and incarceration are both less invasive and expensive supplements to 
incarceration.  
Cost-benefit analyses are a quantitative supplement to the qualitative arguments 
advocating for treatment programs over incarceration on the grounds of moral and ethical 
considerations. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) conducts cost-
benefit analysis by considering “what is the benefit of each dollar of criminal justice 
programming spending as measured for taxpayers by program costs, and for crime 
victims by lower crime rates, and less recidivism.” WSIPP found that drug treatment 
completed while incarcerated returned between $1.91 and $2.69 for every dollar spent. 
Alternatively, community-based drug treatment completed instead of incarceration 
returned $8.87 for every dollar spent. These treatment programs also noted greater rates 
of program completion and smaller rates of recidivism.54  
Recidivism, or when one reoffends after being released from incarceration is an 
important gauge to measure the effectiveness of retributive systems. If incarceration is 
meant to reduce crime, it should also reduce recidivism. For this reason, lower rates of 
recidivism related to treatment driven programs substantiates evidence of these programs’ 
ability to address crime.    
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Drug courts are another route that have been proven to reduce recidivism. Drug 
courts exclusively hear cases related to drug-use and then make recommendations 
accordingly, like routing drug testing, treatment, and surveillance. Drug courts were first 
created in 1989 in Florida and since have expanded across the country.55  
The University of Maryland’s Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
discovered that drug court defendants are notably less likely to be arrested in the year 
following their conviction than those who did not go through the drug courts. Via a grant 
from the National Institute of Justice, researchers at the Urban Institute found that, 
“within one year after graduation, 16.4% of drug court graduates had been charged with a 
serious offense. Within two years, the percentage rises to 27.5%.”56  
In contrast, when the Department of Justice researched general rates of 
recidivism, they determined that roughly 60% of those formerly incarcerated will be re-
arrested within two years and 67.5% will be re-arrested within three years. Specific to 
those arrested for a drug offense, 41.2% are re-arrested.57  
Beyond addressing recidivism, programs commissioned by Drug Treatment 
Courts “reduced the annual cost to house an offender from $20,000 to $4,000,” as 
determined by the Maryland State Commission on Criminal Justice Sentencing. In 
Maryland, when someone is found guilty in a Drug Treatment Court, they are either to 
complete “regimented offender treatment centers, day reporting, intensive supervision, 
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and home detention, and graduated sanctions for program failures” supplemental to time 
spent incarcerated or they participate in diversion programs.58  
Through diversion programs, when someone is convicted of a crime, reparations 
are made through completing treatment programs, paying reparations, or giving back to 
the community through community service. The results of a study conducted in 2010 
revealed that if instead of being sent to prison, 10% of those who qualify for diversion 
programs were sent to community-based substance abuse therapy programs, the criminal 
justice system would save $4.8 billion. Even more, cost-benefit analyses prove that every 
$1 spent towards drug treatment returns $12 in savings on the expenses related to crime 
and incarceration.59  
Diversion programs have proven to be well-received across the country, even in 
predominantly Republican states. Further, diversion programs that address the 
fundamental issues that drove someone to commit a crime also have proven to be more 
successful in both decreasing rates of recidivism.60  
In some cases, the driving factor leading someone to commit a crime is drug use 
and addiction. Addiction itself leads to incarceration on the grounds of drug charges and 
possession. For this reason and many others, addiction is of upmost importance to 
address when working to inspire meaningful change. Incarceration during the War on 
Drugs neglected to address addiction- thus continuing the cycle of addiction (and often 
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incarceration) once an offender was released. In contrast, therapy programs have proven 
to be effectual in minimizing drug use and addiction.    
The National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study (NTIES), as conducted 
by the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment “observed a pattern of substantially 
reduced alcohol and drug use in every type of treatment modality, with reductions 
typically between one-third and two-thirds depending on the type of service unit and the 
specific measure.”61 RAND Corporation contrasted the benefits of a variety of other law 
enforcement tactics to treat intense cocaine addiction and determined that treatment is 
three times more successful than mandatory minimum prison sentences.62 
Validating treatment’s merits through a cost-benefit analysis, RAND corporation 
examined the costs and benefits of drug war enforcement versus those of treatment. 
RAND concluded that for every $1 spent on treatment, $7.50 is saved in lower rates of 
crime and recovered human capital. RAND further reported:  
 
“An additional cocaine-control dollar generates societal cost savings of 15 cents if 
used for source-country control, 32 cents if used for interdiction, and 52 cents if 
used for domestic enforcement. In contrast, the savings from treatment programs 
are larger than control costs: an additional cocaine-control dollar generates 
societal cost savings of $7.48 if used for treatment.”63  
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Cost-benefit analyses continually highlight the effectiveness of therapy programs- 
while saving tax payers’ dollars, therapy programs reduce rates of recidivism and 
addiction. Following a model of more comprehensive approaches to reducing drug use, 
there is now a greater consideration for the motives that drive people to use drugs. As 
Lewis Lapham suggests that “the keepers of the nation’s conscience would be better 
advised to address those conditions- poverty, lack of opportunity and education- from 
which drugs offer an illusory means of escape.”64 
Upon this point, the National Center on Alcoholism and Substance Abuse based 
out of Columbia University remarked:  
 
Drug-involved offenders typically develop chronic dependence on the drug 
economy for subsistence. Reconnecting ex-offenders to the world of legitimate 
employment is crucial to maintaining recovery and reducing future criminal 
behavior. Chronic joblessness or underemployment limits their ability to leave the 
drug-crime lifestyle, to support a family and to successfully transition from the 
treatment program to the community. Repeat felony offenders are ineligible for 
federal education grants, membership in some trade unions and government jobs, 
and in many cases public assistance programs; most lack the social, educational, 
or vocational skills they need to find employment.65  
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For this reason, there are programs across the country that combine therapy and 
rehabilitation with classes that teach the skills necessary to find employment. For 
example, the Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison (DTAP) is based in Brooklyn, New 
York and rehabilitates drug dependent defendants who plead guilty to a crime through a 
residentiary and community-based therapy program for up to two years instead of 
incarceration.66 
92% of DTAP participants were employed after finishing the program. This rate 
of employment after completing the program is over three times greater than rate of 
employment before being arrested. Increasing rates of employment is beneficial to the 
individuals themselves, but also to the community. Commerce is generated and former 
inmates have greater accountability and means to provide for themselves and their 
families.67  
The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse based out of Columbia 
University additionally determined that DTAP substantially decreased rates of recidivism 
and drug use while also empowering more program participants to successfully secure a 
job. Even though DTAP includes residency, vocational training, support services, and 
therapy, it collectively costs collectively $32,974 per patient- half the amount that would 
be spent if the program participant was sent to prison instead for the same length of 
time.68  
                                                     
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
   42 
The cost-benefit analyses included in the chapter thus far clearly evidence the 
merits of therapy-based programming over incarceration. For this reason, one may call 
into question why it took decades for these programs to be implemented.  
Reduced rates of addiction, increased workforce participation, and reduced 
government spending are central to current policy implementation today; politicians 
during the War on Drugs prioritized policies intended to reduce crime rates.  
Policies were initially created in response increases in rates of violent crimes, thus 
placing a greater emphasis on incarceration. In 1960, the American murder rate was 5.1 
per 100,000 and was 10.2 by 1980.69  The illicit drug market played a role in greater 
crime rates. Fear swept the nation, as an Urban League poll reported that over two thirds 
of respondents in low-income communities revealed that they were “afraid to walk in 
their own neighborhoods.”70 While a slippery slope of increasingly stringent and 
draconian policies followed, they were product of a time when dialogue about crime 
dominated public discourse.  
However, crime control has since become less salient of a political issue due to 
rapid decrease in crime rates throughout the 1990s and a changing political and electoral 
context. For this reason, policymakers (especially Republicans) have become more 
inclined to consider therapy-based alternatives and depart from tough-on-crime polices.   
While paramount to Republican electoral success during the 1980s and 1990s, 
being tough-on-crime was not so by the 2000s. Campaigns and Elections Magazine 
wrote that Republicans had relied on “the bitter irony for conservatives is that their 
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success in moving the nation toward their side on many of these issues has taken them 
away as prime campaign fodder.” 71 By making crime the wedge issue it became, 
Democrats needed to tap into (thus similarly benefitting from) this issue for political and 
electoral success.  
President Bill Clinton and Congressional Democrats matched conservative efforts 
to gain control over the issue. Staffers alerted Clinton early in his presidency of “the 
prospect of a bidding war in both houses, in which Republicans and even liberal 
Democrats would compete to prove that they care more about crime than the 
administration,” continuing that, “ Senator Biden and others are urging us to pre-empt 
this debate by pledging more resources for cops, drug treatment, and prisons.”72  
Biden played an integral part in facilitating the debate, as he aimed to “maintain 
crime as a Democratic initiative” and to “control the agenda.”73 Biden pressed for the 
“rapid enactment of the Biden/Clinton bill,” named so to drive home the role the 
Democratic party played in its implementation.  
However, by emphasizing his role, Biden became engrained in the tough-on-
crime narrative. This is still relevant today, as Biden has entered the 2020 presidential 
race. Biden has since apologized for this role and has advocated for the softening of 
sentencing laws while he was vice president during the Obama administration. 
Regardless of these apologies, Biden was instrumental in passing the 1994 Violent Crime 
Control Act and even sponsored the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act.74   
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Biden took pride in both his role and the Democratic party’s role instituting 
tough-on-crime policies. In response to Senator Hatch charging Democrats with “bowing 
to the liberal wing of the Democratic Party,” insinuating that they were still not tough 
enough on crime, Biden responded asserting,  
 
Let me define the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. The liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party has 70 enhanced penalties, and my friend from California, 
Senator Feinstein, outlined every one of them. I gave a list to her today. She asked 
what is in there to every one of them. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is 
for 125,000 new State prison cells. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is 
not the old wing I knew. So if that is what he [Hatch] defines as the liberal wing 
of the Democratic party, then I suspect I would like to see the conservative wing 
of the Democratic Party.75 
 
Just as tough-on-crime polices represented an ideological departure in the 
Democratic party, they also represented one in the Republican party. The Republican 
party is generally concerned with limiting government spending, yet largely disregarded 
this ideological tenant during the War on Drugs. While exorbitant spending could be 
reconciled during the War on Drugs, tactics to minimize government expenditures 
became a greater political and electoral priority again for the Republican party.   
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The repercussions of the 2001 and 2008 economic recessions influenced reform 
efforts, as many states were looking for techniques to reduce spending. Additionally, the 
momentum of a growing Tea Party movement within the Republican party inspired 
stauncher anti-statist attitudes regarding government oversight and spending.76  
To quote former Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, “Economics put limits on 
people’s utopias.”77 War on Drug policies were economically irrational- with exorbitant 
costs despite few successes. Cost-benefit analyses have consistently demonstrated that 
unlike tough-on-crime policies, therapeutic programs are cost-effective and have a 
significantly more positive impact. Coupled with the declining salience of crime control 
as political and electoral issues, “stiff sentencing and more prisons,” moved instead 
towards “smart sentencing and less incarceration.”78 
This chapter has paid greater attention to the data and logic that informs policy-
making. However, numbers and political strategy are part of the picture. While statistics 
can be used to discuss rates of recidivism and addiction, they do not reflect the 
implications of such on those most affected by these policies. The following chapter will 
shed greater light on the social context that inspires policy-making, how different 
demographics benefit or are damaged product of such, and how this has played in the 
move away from drug war tactics.  
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Chapter 3: Drug Policies and Socioeconomic Disparities  
While the United States is one of the most financially prosperous countries in 
history, there is inherent socioeconomic inequality and in many ways a disregard for this 
imbalance.79 This imbalance is manifested in a number of ways- most pertinent to this 
context, the quality and quantity of resources available and the extent to which one’s ice is 
heard and valued by policymakers.  
In this chapter, I will argue that the shift away from War on Drug policies towards 
those of the War on Drugs to the opioid epidemic has been undoubtedly influenced by 
socioeconomic imbalances.  
This chapter will contextualize the relationship between poverty and the drug wars 
by considering the decline of the welfare state, economic collapse in low-income 
communities, targeted and disproportionate punishment aimed towards these communities, 
and lacking resources to contest or abet these punishments.  
It would be remiss to disregard the role of race in these epidemics, as those 
affected by the crack epidemic were predominantly African American while those 
affected by the opioid epidemic of the most recent decade are predominantly white 
Americans. Race is undeniably intertwined in the narrative of the War on Drugs, but the 
shift from drug war policies to those of today can be better substantiated by a discussion 
of socioeconomics.  
Identifying race as the predominant factor in drug policymaking presupposes that 
racial animus that drove the War on Drugs. But that assumption is far from clear. 
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Although it remains a hotly contested question, much evidence suggests that the War on 
Drugs was driven by supplemental factors, such as class tensions, decline of the welfare 
state, and a desire to protect African Americans from the scourge of drugs.   
While there are undeniably racial elements to the war on drugs, it is important to 
keep in mind the role the African American community played in shaping the war on 
drugs and criminal policy as “citizens, voters, mayors, legislators, prosecutors, police 
officers, police chiefs, corrections officials, and community activists.”80  
Readdressing socioeconomics and more specifically today’s context, this chapter 
will address why today’s softer approaches to address drug use have been informed by a 
greater percentage of middle- to upper-class individuals affected by the opioid crisis. This 
demographic has been proven to use illicit drugs with greater frequency than those in low-
income communities, yet very rarely spend time incarcerated for drug use or possession. 
In spite of this, it is licit drugs that this demographic has become hooked on more than 
illicit drugs. Greater advocacy responses and policy changes that have followed the opioid 
epidemic reflect the bureaucratic tendency to value certain constituents’ voices over 
other’s.  
While the new therapy-driven and sympathetic policies benefit those across all 
demographics, one cannot help but wonder how the crack epidemic would have been 
different if this sympathy existed then.  
At the same time that the War on Drugs gained steam, low-income urban 
communities were hit with extraordinary economic hardship. Factory jobs had been a 
common occupation for the decades prior, as they did not require as much formal 
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education and were consistent but began to vanish as companies began to outsource labor 
to other countries.81 In tandem, institutional changes were made to welfare programs 
which hindered many from accessing the resources necessary for survival- food, shelter, 
and healthcare. For these reasons, poverty became nearly inescapable in low-income 
communities. As poverty continued, so did drug use, as intoxication can allow for 
disassociation from the reality of poverty, lack of opportunity and education.82 
During the Clinton Administration, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act was implemented, replacing Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (ADFC) with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). 
Not only did TANF limit assistance to five-years maximum over one’s life, but also 
barred anyone who had been convicted of a felony drug offense from welfare and food 
stamps.83 To finance the War on Drugs, funding for welfare programs was reallocated 
towards law enforcement. The budget for prisons soon became twice what had been 
allotted to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (ADFC) or food stamps.84  
Resources that had previously been used to support public housing were now used 
to finance prison construction. When President Bill Clinton was in office, Washington 
DC decreased resources for public housing by $17 billion, a cutback of 61%. Federally 
assisted public housing programs also had the authority to deny applicants with a 
criminal record. At this same time, funding for corrections was increased by $19 billion, 
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an amplification of 171%. Some commented that these policies made “the construction of 
prisons the nation’s main housing program for the urban poor.”85 
Drug war policies themselves further perpetuated hardship and poverty in low-
income urban communities by taking advantage of those with minimal resources to 
contest charges. For example, asset forfeiture allows for the confiscation of cash, cars, or 
other property presumed to be related to criminal activity, even if the owner is not 
arrested for a crime. 80% of civil asset forfeitures are from those who never receive 
criminal charges.86  
There were many innocent men and women affected by asset confiscation. An 
ACLU report from Philadelphia revealed that 71% of those affected by cash forfeiture 
annually were never convicted of a crime. Those in low-income communities are more 
inclined to carry cash, thus making them more susceptible. Those affected by civil asset 
forfeiture did not generally have the capability to challenge civil forfeiture proceedings, 
meaning that they very rarely took action to seek reparations for their wrongfully 
confiscated assets. 87  
In 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF) had over 
$1 billion in forfeited assets that could be used to finance federal law enforcement. For 
context, in 1986, one year after the AFF began, it acquired $93.7 million in forfeited 
assets. In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department had over $400 million in forfeited assets. 
Asset forfeiture was not just on the federal level. Between 2001 and 2002, currency 
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forfeitures in nine states amounted to over $70 million. This does not even take into 
account cars and other forfeited possessions.88  
Another drug war policy with intense repercussions in low-income communities 
for consideration is plea bargaining- when a defendant is coerced into agreeing to a 
prison sentence due to the threat of a lengthier one. Many stories are told of defendants 
innocent defendants accepting plea bargains to avoid decades-long sentences. The United 
States is the only liberal democracy that offers plea bargaining.89  
In his book Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration-and How to 
Achieve Real Reform, John Pfaff articulates the authority prosecutors yield product of 
plea bargaining, saying, “There is basically no limit to how prosecutors can use the 
charges available to them to threaten defendants… Nearly everyone in prison ended up 
there by signing a piece of paper in a dingy conference room in a county office 
building.”90  
95% of criminal cases in the United States are resolved in plea bargaining. As a 
result, prosecutors make these important decisions regarding crime and punishment 
without even having to enter a courtroom. This gave great authority to prosecutors to 
indict large numbers of defenders, especially those who did not have the financial 
resources to contest charges.91  
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Public defenders are a valuable resource to those who cannot afford an attorney. 
The majority of defendants rely on public defenders. However, public defenders also lack 
the resources necessary to aid all that need it. The journalist Amy Bach recounts a day 
she observed a public defender “plead out” 48 defendants consecutively.92 
Inadequate resources are a common theme in the circumstances leading to drug-
related incarceration. Beyond barriers to legal resources, low-income individuals also had 
insufficient means to treat mental illness. Given the extortionate price of healthcare, low-
income individuals may not have the ability to procure psychiatric medicines or 
treatments to treat their conditions. This leaves this demographic vulnerable to drug use 
and incarceration.  
The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in 2017 that roughly 50% of those in jail 
today are diagnosed with a mental illness and more than 25% have serious conditions, 
like bipolar disorder. 75% of those in prison who are mentally ill had formerly spent time 
in prison or jail, meaning that they reoffended.93 Those in charge of correctional facilities 
and private health-care companies alike acknowledge that psychiatric facilities would be 
a more appropriate place to treat mentally ill people, especially if the inmate is 
considered nonviolent. 94 Thankfully today, there is a greater recognition of the role 
mental illness plays in drug use and crime. For this reason, policy initiatives like the 
Affordable Care Act have tried to break down the barriers to resources.  
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Thus far, the chapter has contextualized the relationship between poverty and the 
drug wars by considering the decline of the welfare state, economic collapse in low-
income communities, targeted and disproportionate punishment aimed towards these 
communities, and lacking resources to contest or abet these punishments. These actions 
continued for many years, as this demographic did not have the same means of advocacy 
or for many years the attention of policymakers. 
From this point forward, the rest of the chapter will be devoted to addressing how 
middle- to upper-class individuals were able to circumnavigate significant punishment for 
illicit drug use during the drug wars. It will further address how this demographic has 
been able to inspire policy changes in response to the opioid epidemic and licit drug 
addiction.  
Due to disproportionate policing, there is a misconception that rates of drug use 
are more prevalent in low-income communities95 However, as journalist William 
Raspberry describes, the typical drug user is really a “college student, a young 
professional, a wage earner or a suburban sophisticate” in his article entitled “Go After 
the Drug Buyers Too.”96  
The National Institute of Health (NIH) reports that, “Those with the highest 
incomes were most likely to have engaged in extra-medical use of all drug types but for 
cocaine.” Cocaine deviated not because those with lower-incomes use it at a greater rate, 
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but because the number of respondents who had used cocaine in the NIH survey cocaine 
was not large enough.97   
When investigating dissimilar rates of arrests between crack and cocaine, 
researchers at New York University learned that crack users (those most probably from 
low-income communities) were 18 times more likely to be arrested for drug possession 
than cocaine users (those most probably from higher-income communities.)98  
On the demand side of drug markets, buyers can come from any neighborhood 
and social class. However, on the supply side, drug dealers can easily be found selling on 
street corners and in public spaces and come primarily from the most poverty-stricken 
and non-white areas of the city. Police with arrest quotas know they can meet said quotas. 
Researchers infer that spatially discriminatory policing was what inspired larger and 
growing rates of imprisonment and recidivism in specific neighborhoods, despite crime 
rates decreasing.99 Those with monetary resources in higher socioeconomic stratums had 
other means to acquire drugs at a lower risk where they know police will not be nearby.  
Considering the demand side of drug markets during the opioid crisis, these 
middle- to upper-class individuals are often the ones hooked on prescribed licit 
medications. For this reason, their supplier is a sanctioned healthcare provider. More 
broadly, today’s “drug dealers” are pharmaceutical companies. For this reason, 
enforcement and policies look different.  As academic and author, Natalie Murakawa 
writes-  
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Accumulated advantage imparts a presumption of innocence; inherited wealth 
enables home owners in class-segregated areas (i.e., ‘a safe neighborhood’) and 
medical insurance for diagnosis of conditions and coverage of various prescriptions 
such as Ritalin (i.e., more effective form of meth). In contrast, accumulated 
disadvantage imparts a presumption of guilt.100  
If this is so, the accumulated advantage of someone in a higher socio-economic 
stratum both allows one to afford both healthcare (i.e., opioid prescriptions) and the 
presumption of innocence, rather than the low-income individuals presumed guilty and 
stigmatized for the use of illicit drugs. The accumulated advantage results in treatment, 
while the accumulated disadvantage results in incarceration.101 Murkawa’s line of thought 
encapsulates the role socioeconomics have played in today’s opioid crisis.  
          This is further reflected in the ability middle- to upper-class individuals have played 
in facilitating a new dialogue and policies. Michael Botticelli, former director of the White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy said, “Because the demographic of people 
affected are more-white, more middle class, these are parents who are empowered. They 
know how to call a legislator, they know how to get angry with their insurance company, 
they know how to advocate. They have been so instrumental in changing the 
conversation.”102  
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Families affected by the heroin crisis lobby the state and federal government, hold 
rallies and start nonprofit organizations with hopes of challenging the draconian methods 
of traditional drug enforcement. For example, Jim Hood lost his son to heroin and was 
inspired to organize the “Unite to Face Addiction” rally in Washington DC. This rally 
included musicians like Sheryl Crow. Following the event, over 750 groups cooperated to 
create Facing Addiction, a national organization that works to combat addiction. Today, 
Facing Addiction has a scale comparable to the American Cancer Society and American 
Heart Society.103  
In contrast, during the War on Drugs, many voices were unheard from behind 
bars.  Ingrained in our “concept of criminal ‘guilt,’ we miss the larger social context in 
which crime takes place, and how we need to broaden our blame in order to adjust our 
justice.”104 While policy changes have been made to provide treatment to those plagued 
by addiction and decrease drug-driven incarceration, one must consider that this 
sympathy did not exist for those who arguably needed it the most. In tandem to 
institutional reform of the welfare system and economic collapse, heightened disciplinary 
action resulted in generations essentially confined to a life of poverty.  
          Greater advocacy responses and policy changes that have followed the opioid 
epidemic reflect the bureaucratic tendency to value certain constituents’ voices over 
other’s, as today’s softer approaches to address drug use have been informed by a greater 
percentage of middle- to upper-class individuals affected by the opioid crisis.  
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The following chapter will continue a discussion of how economic resources inform 
enforcement and policy responses. Instead of discussing this on the individual level, this 
dialogue will expand to include the corporations who are complicit in the opioid epidemic. 
With astronomical profits that afford great influence and clout, the pharmaceutical 
companies who manufacture highly addictive opioids are able to elude significant 
punishment. While these companies use eerily similar tactics to black market drug dealers, 
the licit nature of pharmaceuticals and the role of the medical model complex adds an 
additional dimension for consideration into why the United States has departed from drug 
war tactics. 
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Chapter 4: Context of Today’s Opioid Epidemic 
 
Regarding today’s crisis, political commentator Stephen Colbert said, “There are 
certain subjects that are genuinely hard to talk about like the opioid crisis. It’s an 
epidemic that affects both political parties, Republican, Democrat, rich people, poor 
people, it does not discriminate. A lot of people blame Big Pharma, but only because it’s 
their fault.”105 
The United States has been confronted by an epidemic of opioid use and 
addiction, inherently linked to the overprescribing of opioids, like OxyContin. The Center 
for Disease Control (CDC) reports that rates of opioid prescriptions have quadrupled in 
the years since 1999. Over 40 Americans die from a prescription opioid overdose 
daily.106 This follows decades of overprescribing opioids, to the point where OxyContin 
was being prescribed for pain management when Tylenol would have sufficed.107  
          The opioid epidemic is dissimilar to the heroin and crack epidemics of the past as it 
is characterized by both illicit and licit drugs. While the addictive nature of the licit drugs 
has been thoroughly documented, it is unrealistic to wage a “war” on these drugs when 
there is also a documented health benefit. In this chapter, I will argue that policies are 
different today than during the War on Drugs as the medical model that emphasizes 
drugs, medical treatment, and surgery has become engrained in culture, the economy, and 
politics.  
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I will further argue that the opioid epidemic has not fallen under the umbrella of 
tough-on-crime War on Drugs policies in large part because of the influence 
pharmaceutical companies have over presidential administrations, governmental agencies 
like the FDA, and the legislative branch, thus allowing for less industry regulation. 
Paradoxically, greater leniency in licit drug policy and regulation stands in direct 
defiance of the bureaucratic aim to minimize drug use and addiction cited to justify the 
War on (illicit) Drugs. While incompatible on the surface level, this thesis concludes that 
lenient policies towards drug users and towards pharmaceutical companies both reflect 
how the medicalization of American society has influenced the departure from the War 
on Drugs. 
          To first consider, today’s epidemic is characterized by both licit and illicit drugs, 
unlike the crack epidemic. As licit drugs serve a medicinal purpose, they must be 
regulated and not banned, unlike the instinctual response to prohibit illicit drugs. 
          For many, responding to illicit drug violations with harsh sentencing involves less 
moral consciousness, as these drugs are sold in markets characterized by violence and 
those charged with possession made the active decision to seek out drugs like crack 
cocaine despite its prohibition. The response to criminalize illicit opioid use has 
additional dimensions, as some develop addiction after being prescribed opioids for pain 
management rather than after explicitly seeking opioids out for intoxication.  
          Even though illicit heroin and fentanyl are responsible for overdose deaths at a 
greater frequency than prescribed opioids, there is an intrinsic and perhaps causal 
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relationship between opioid and heroin use.108 The American Society of Addiction 
Medicine reports that 80% of those who use heroin began with prescription narcotics, 
eventually moving onto heroin as it is less expensive.109 As the relationship between licit 
and illicit opioid use has proven to be causal relationship, policies today reflect greater 
sympathy to drug users- whether or not they use licit or illicit drugs.  
          The initial and especially potent OxyContin design prompted addiction in so many; 
but once its potency was reduced following its reformulated, users instead resorted to 
heroin. Heroin dealers from Mexico spread throughout the United States at greater rates 
to sell to the growing market of those initially hooked on OxyContin and the likes.110 
          Those hooked on prescription narcotics may also turn to heroin in instances where 
governmental action is taken against prescription narcotics. For example, in 2011, Florida 
Attorney General Pam Bondi collaborated with the state legislature to increase 
enforcement and implementation of the Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs. At this 
time, there were more pain clinics (“pill mills”) than McDonalds in the state. While 
Florida noted a significant decrease in fatalities related to opioids like OxyContin and 
Oxycodone, there was a rapid increase in overdoses from fentanyl-laced heroin. Today, 
14 people die from an opioid-related overdose in Florida daily.111  
          The marked expansion of general drug use in America has prompted drug markets 
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(both licit and illicit) to reach a broader range of ages, geographical regions, and 
demographics.112 The War on Drugs was posed as a means “to save middle-class kids 
from the threat of a drug epidemic,” yet it did not protect against dangers of licit drugs. 113 
Adolescents use licit psychoactive drugs more often to get intoxicated, like narcotics and 
amphetamines. These drugs are easily accessed from family members prescriptions, are 
low in cost, and pose little legal threat. As comprehensive drug sales increased by 40% 
between 1990 and 2010, misuse of prescription drugs in adolescents between the ages of 
twelve and sixteen has also increased. Data suggests that 15% of students in high school 
“pharm” prescribed medicines.114  
          Illicit drugs are often represented as being distinctively addictive and injurious, but 
we often disregard these same characteristics in over-the-counter pharmaceuticals. The 
opioid crisis has proven that heroin and prescribed opioids alike can result in addiction; 
intense health, financial, and social costs; and fatalities.115 This reality has become more 
apparent at a time when marijuana, a once deeply criminalized drug, is now being used 
for medicinal and recreational purposes with great success.  
As the medical marijuana movement gained momentum across the country, the 
nation has observed the drug’s ability remedy issues rather than creating them, as 
suggested by governmental rhetoric and media portrayal for decades.  
Today, twenty-five states and Washington DC implemented medical marijuana 
systems. By the beginning of 2016, an additional sixteen states approved the medical use 
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of cannabidiol oils, which remain illicit under the Controlled Substances Act. States that 
have not sanctioned the use of medicinal marijuana are objectively the country’s most 
conservative. However, polling data still indicates significant support for medical 
marijuana. Recent polling demonstrated “75% in Alabama, 80% in Georgia, and 71% in 
Oklahoma” were in favor of implementing a medical marijuana system.116  
While state and local governments across the country advocate for more liberal 
drug policies that include the legalization of marijuana, the federal level anti-drug 
establishment remain inflexible. Marijuana, which is less expensive, easily attainable, and 
does not produce the same harmful side-effects could challenge Big Pharma’s profits if 
consumers chose marijuana over vexed pharmaceuticals like Vicodin and OxyContin. 
For this reason, the War on Drugs has been propelled by a coalition between Big 
Pharma and governmental powers- with mutual support for prohibition. Exemplifying 
such is the Partnership for a Drug-Free America (PDFA). Created in the 1990s, PDFA 
was predominantly funded by pharmaceutical companies like Merck, Pfizer, Johnson & 
Johnson, Bristol-Myers, Squibb, and Procter and Gamble. Insurance companies like 
Aetna, Metropolitan Life, and Allstate also were liberal with donations. Non-drug 
companies like Comcast, JPMorgan Chase, and Disney corporation also became involved 
with PDFA in the last decade PDFA educated adolescents about the dangers of “killer 
weed” and the “plague of street drugs,” asserting that addiction was society’s greatest 
malady.117  
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This sort of hyperbolic rhetoric stands in contrast to the rhetoric used by 
pharmaceutical advertisements that minimize the ramifications of opioid drug use. A 
dichotomy exists between Big Pharma’s corporate interest regarding drug prevention and 
its corporate interest in maximizing pharmaceutical sales represents a chasm between 
moral and economic imperative. Big Pharma companies were driven by profit and a 
disregard for the addictive nature of its product- ultimately leading to what has become 
the most fatal drug epidemic in the United States. 
The role Big Pharma has played in informing drug policies over the last twenty 
years cannot be overstated. PDFA represent how Big Pharma has advocated for greater 
stringency and continued drug war tactics. Alternative to this, Big Pharma has advocated 
(with great success) for pro-business regulatory and enforcement policies. Mechanisms 
that afford Big Pharma the ability to influence drug policies are cyclical: profits 
heightened from less regulation affords the corporations the financial means to lobby the 
government for additional freedom. 
Via its relationship with the government, Big Pharma companies have been able 
to obtain significant subsidies, obstruct imports, sponsor research, contest regulations, 
slacken FDA’s testing protocols, hinder DEA enforcement, and directly advertise to 
consumers.118 All of these privileges indicate greater leniency in drug policy creation and 
enforcement. 
Purdue Pharma best represents how Big Pharma corporations have been able to 
achieve great economic and political success via lenient drug policies. Purdue Pharma 
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first released OxyContin inn 1996-  a prescribed opioid that is chemically similar to 
heroin and two times more potent than morphine. 119 OxyContin quickly became the most 
commonly prescribed name brand narcotic in the United States. Five years following 
OxyContin’s introduction, sales surpassed more than $1 billion annually.120 Since then, 
OxyContin has made $35 billion in revenue for the company. Forbes labeled the 
Sackler’s (the company’s founders) as one of the most affluent families in the country, 
with a collective net worth surmounting $13 billion.121  
While “the goal should have been to sell the least dose of the drug to the smallest 
number of patients,” this goal was out of line with the company’s revenue driven 
approach.122 Purdue Pharma’s sales department was motivated to promote OxyContin 
with memos from sales managers like, “$$$$$$$$$$$$$ It’s Bonus Time in the 
Neighborhood!”123 
Before Purdue Pharma introduced OxyContin, opioids had been exclusively for 
terminally ill patients or to treat pain prompted by cancer. Purdue Pharma identified an 
opening in the market and started to zero in on general practitioners with little history of 
treating intense chronic pain. Purdue Pharma began the practice of prescribing opioids for 
common-place chronic pain, additionally inspiring other pharmaceuticals to do the 
same.124 This pivot from selective prescribing for especially ill patients towards 
prescribing to address a myriad of pains exponentially increased the amount of opioid 
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being prescribed while driving many to addiction.125 Purdue Pharma advertised 
OxyContin as a harmless prescription, saying that only 1% of those prescribed would 
become addicted. This misinformation made health care practitioners and consumers 
alike unwary of prescribing substantial doses for a lengthy period of time.126  
Business tactics demonstrate the company’s awareness of the product’s 
addictiveness. Even worse than a disregard of the drugs addictive nature, Purdue Pharma 
actively capitalized on OxyContin’s addictive nature. This recognition is important, as it 
signals Purdue Pharma’s malintent and culpability. For this reason, one would assume 
that legal punishment would match those taken against illicit drug dealers who act with 
similar intent and methods. 
Parallels between Purdue Pharma and the illicit drug markets are plentiful. As 
Sam Quinones, author of Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s Opiate Epidemic 
points out, both the Xalisco boys and Purdue Pharma single out their market by finding 
the local methadone clinic. Purdue Pharma uses Information Medical Statistics (IMS) 
data to determine which locations and demographics will be persuadable and vulnerable 
to OxyContin marketing.127  
Lawyer Mitchel Denham says that Purdue Pharma identified “communities where 
there is a lot of poverty and a lack of education and opportunity… looking at numbers 
that showed these people have work-related injuries, they go to the doctor more often, 
they get treatment for pain.” The implications of such advertising efforts are directly 
correlated to opioid abuse, as a county-by-bounty analysis demonstrated greater rates of 
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opioid use in counties drug companies concentrated their advertising.128  
       Another parallel between Purdue Pharma and the illicit drug markets, just as the 
Xalisco boys provide prospective customers with samples of their product free of charge, 
so did Purdue Pharma. When Purdue Pharma first launched OxyContin, they 
implemented a program where medical professionals could give patients coupons for a 
free first prescription. This program was terminated four years after its inception. In that 
span of time, 34,000 of these coupons had been used.129  
This coupon program targeted consumers and healthcare practitioners alike. A 
similar tactic, Purdue Pharma implemented a “speaker bureau” that compensated 
healthcare professionals for educating patients and colleagues about OxyContin. When 
payments by drug companies are made to medical professionals per 100,000 people to 
market the pharmaceutical opioids, fatalities prompted by opioid overdoses increased by 
18% with every three supplemental payments to medical professionals.130 
There were certainly physicians who actively partook in black market sales by 
creating pill mills- pain management clinics that prescribe for profit over anything else.131 
However, this does not represent the vast majority of healthcare providers, as many were 
simply swept up and seduced by Purdue Pharma’s aggressive tactics.132 
Keith Humphreys, former drug-policy advisor to the Obama Administration and 
current professor at Stanford University laments, “The real Greek tragedy of this [is] that 
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so many well-meaning doctors got co-opted.133 Those within Purdue Pharma understood 
that most doctors incorrectly believed that Oxycodone was not as potent as morphine. 
Rather than addressing this misconception, Purdue Pharma exploited it- further evidence 
of malintent and culpability.134          
Despite considerable evidence indicating the contrary, Purdue Pharma 
consistently charges physicians with being the actors to create and amplify the opioid 
crisis are. Addressing this inaccuracy, Healthcare Distribution Alliance Senior Vice 
President John Parker said, “the idea that distributors are responsible for the number of 
opioid prescriptions written defies common sense and lacks understanding of how the 
pharmaceutical supply chain actually works and is regulated.”135  
Upon this point, Jim Geldohf, former DEA program manager in Detroit remarked, 
“When you’re selling half a million pills to some pharmacy and you’re telling me that 
you don’t know what the rules are for a suspicious order? Greed always trumped 
compliance. It did every time. It was about money, and it’s as simple as that.”136  
Under normal protocol, the DEA should halt such astronomical pharmaceutical 
deliveries. However, Big Pharma had the power to influence legislation that would hinder 
the DEA’s enforcement abilities.  Spearhead by Representative Tom Marino, the policy 
bars the DEA from blocking suspicious pharmaceutical shipments from the companies. 
When initially blocked, Marino charged the DEA with treating pharmaceutical 
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companies as they were “illicit narcotic cartels,” further claiming that “this mind-set was 
extremely dangerous to legitimate business.” After the Ensuring Patient Access and 
Effective Drug Enforcement Act was implemented, there was a drastic decrease in 
measures taken against questionable pharmaceutical orders. In 2011, 65 pharmaceutical 
orders were suspended in contrast to six orders in 2017.137  
While the chapter has largely focused on Purdue Pharma, they are not lone actors, 
as other pharmaceutical companies have garnered a similarly extensive scope, influence, 
and assets of oligarchic proportions. 
This instance with the DEA is by no means an anomaly, as Big Pharma has 
extensive ties to the medical system, federal government, state governments, federal 
agencies, and the media. This is a story of political influence, as today’s drug dealers 
have bureaucratic influence over regulation and policymaking, thus ensuring their own 
economic success. It is for this reason that supply-side action is so different today than it 
was during the War on Drugs.  
While the FDA was intended to serve a watch-dog agency over the drug industry, 
it has for decades been a pawn to corporate interests. When Congress implemented the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act, drug companies now began to pay FDA “user fees” for 
mandated testing, fees to accelerate permission to release drugs to market, which is often 
a complicated and drawn-out process. Drug companies now spent $310,000 for each 
application. These fees eventually accounted for half of the FDA budget, making the 
department reliant on the companies they were supposed to be monitoring.138 As the 
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agency became so dependent on user fees from Big Pharma, the the relationship between 
the FDA and Big Pharma progressively mirrored that of two businesses cooperating. 
OxyContin was introduced without any formal clinical studies on how addictive 
the drug was. Additionally, there have never been any documented clinical trials that 
explicitly display the success of opioids in treating chronic pain.139 However, the FDA 
sanctioned the narcotic and further described the pill’s patented delayed-absorption as a 
way to “reduce the abuse liability.” Dr. Curits Wright was the F.D.A. official who 
approved OxyContin and promoted it with intense zeal, only to begin working at Purdue 
Pharma shortly after.140  
For over ten years, Big Pharma would spend tens of thousands of dollars for each 
opportunity to have its representative directly collaborate with FDA officials regarding 
opioid policies. Beyond lobbying the FDA, Big Pharma annually spends billions on 
donations to politicians, especially Republicans.141 Big Pharma was very generous to the 
Bush presidential campaigns, the McCain campaign, and the Romney campaign. Big 
Pharma used $152 million in lobbying efforts during 2016, reports the Center for 
Responsive Politics. Big Pharma donated over $20 million specifically to campaigns. 
60% of this sum went to Republicans. Former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan received 
the greatest amount with contributions coming to $228,670.142 90% of members in the 
House of Representatives and 97 of the 100 US senators have received campaign funding 
from Big Pharma.143  
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Since Big Pharma gained prominence in the 1990s, all White House 
administrations and many congressional representatives have forged close ties. Even 
while during his campaign, Obama condemned Big Pharma for their role in making 
healthcare so expensive, he nonetheless formed close relationships with Big Pharma. 
Billy Tauzin, then President and CEO of PhRMA (the pharmaceutical lobbying group) 
became a close ally with Obama in 2009. Obama collaborated with Tauzin and CEOs of 
pharmaceutical companies like Merck and Pfizer to restrict less expensive imports, 
challenge price limits, and guarantee government subsidies with the contingency that Big 
Pharma would champion the administration’s reforms. On behalf of nonprofit health care, 
James Lowe said, “Since Obama came into office, the drug industry has received 
everything it wants.”144  
PhRMA, the trade association, is the biggest at large interest-group, employing 
over 150 lobbying firms and 675 lobbyists. Lobbyists for PhRMA include twenty-five 
former representatives.145 Beyond PhRMA, other lobbying groups exist on behalf of Big 
Pharma. Citizens for Better Medicare presents itself as a grassroots organization led by 
senior citizen groups but was created with the exclusive intent of advocating for Big 
Pharma-specific issues.146 The Pain Care Forum (PCF) was created by a Purdue Pharma 
lobbyist. The American Cancer Society has a lobbying subdivision sponsored mostly by 
pharmaceutical companies and advocates that cancer patients should continue to be 
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prescribed opioids with regularity.147 
          On the state level, the Center for Public Integrity reports, “The makers of 
prescription painkillers have adopted a 50-state strategy that includes hundreds of 
lobbyists and millions in campaign contributions to help kill or weaken measures aimed 
at stemming the tide of prescription opioids.”148 An example of this, New Mexico has the 
second greatest rates of opioid deaths behind West Virginia. In 2012, a bill was proposed 
that would have restricted prescriptions to a seven-day maximum for pain management. 
This bill was shot down after Big Pharma lobbyists fought against it and spent $32,000 
lobbying the state legislature.149 Additionally, a meeting in San Francisco of West Coast 
attorneys generals was sponsored by opioid producers and distributors who expended 
over $100,000 on the event. There are federal restrictions for Congressional lobbyists, but 
none for lobbying state attorneys general.150 
Despite Big Pharma’s influence and resources, legal action has been sought 
against these corporations (namely Purdue Pharma). Legal action against these 
companies request compensation for those affected by the epidemic, rulings to stop all 
misleading marketing, and require greater liability from the companies. Today, over forty 
state attorneys general have collaborated to conduct an investigation into the industry. 
Hundreds of local governments are additionally seeking legal action against the opioid 
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industry.151  
          Lewis S. Nelson, chairman of the Department of Emergency Medicine at Rutgers 
University describes the state’s motivation, saying “It became a state issue because there 
wasn’t a lot of movement on the federal level. to this date, the federal government hasn’t 
been very effective at regulating the practices of these pharmaceutical companies.” 
Beyond the harm done to those affected firsthand by the opioid crisis, New Jersey has 
noted how expensive the epidemic is. The cost of hospital bills, drug courts, and 
emergency responses are born by states.152 
          For this reason, New Jersey has sought legal action against a subdivision of Johnson 
& Johnson that produces opioids, charging the company with misinforming consumers 
about the addictive nature of the drugs. This is the first time that New Jersey has taken 
legal action against any company based in the state. The opioid crisis has been especially 
harmful in the state.153  
       Leading the largest legal battle against Big Pharma is Mike Moore. He and the suit 
maintain that Purdue Pharma was disingenuous about the addictive character of the 
opioids to both consumers and medical professionals He acted as the attorney general of 
Mississippi from 1988 to 2004 but is most recognized for his role in negotiating the $246 
billion, 46-state settlement with Big Tobacco companies at the end of the 1990s. This 
settlement prompted major advertising restrictions for tobacco and endowed anti-
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smoking initiatives.154  
          Following Moore’s Big Tobacco settlement, television became saturated with 
infomercials campaigning against cigarettes, labels were slapped across cigarette 
packages warning of the danger, and curriculums in educational systems increased 
discussions of tobacco. If Moore is as successful in today’s opioid case as he was in the 
tobacco one, there could be great room for new methods of prevention.          
 In the meantime, regardless of legal action and fees, Big Pharma continues 
similar practices without serious ramification. When Purdue Pharma settled for $60 
million in 2007, political commentator Stephen Colbert remarked, “You know you’ve 
been bad when the government fines you one aircraft carrier. Of course, this same time 
they made $35 billion.”155 Fines paid by these corporations- while exorbitant- are 
comparatively small in context to overall profits.  
Big Pharma executives, while behaving in eerily similar ways to illicit drug 
dealers, evade prison time. This stands in stark contrast to those who were punished 
during the War on Drugs. While Purdue Pharma and its counterparts may receive 
penalties consequent of their actions, by no means is their punishment parallel to those 
criminalized during the War on Drugs.  
A slippery slope of corporate influence transformed supposed watchdog 
organizations like the FDA and DEA into largely pro-business entities. A balance must 
exist between more lenient policies of enforcement for common-place drug offenders 
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versus lenient regulatory policies resulting in limited governmental oversight of potent 
and addictive painkillers.  
As licit drugs sold by Big Pharma serve a medicinal purpose, they must be 
regulated and not banned, unlike the instinctual response to prohibit illicit drugs. For this 
reason, change can only happen once our hyper-medicalized society addresses notions on 
pain management and the conflicting role Big Pharma has played in facilitating policy. 
While incompatible on the surface level, this thesis concludes that lenient policies 
towards drug users and towards pharmaceutical companies both reflect how the 
medicalization of American society has influenced the departure from the War on Drugs. 
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Conclusion:  
This thesis sought to answer why policy responses to the opioid crisis are so 
different than those of the War on Drugs- given the inherent dissimilarities between the 
War on Drugs and policy responses to the opioid crisis.  
       To do so, I considered public health-driven responses aimed towards addressing 
addiction. This follows decades of tough-on-crime drug policies and sentencing. I further 
considered why supply-side enforcement looks so different during the opioid crisis 
compared to during the War on Drugs. Matthew Murphy, former Chief of Pharmaceutical 
Investigations for the DEA in Boston makes the acute distinction, “the heroin and cocaine 
traffickers didn’t have a class ring on their finger from a prestigious university.”156 
       With “politically Machiavellian” efforts, pharmaceutical companies have gained the 
authority to influence greater leniency in regulatory and legislative policies.157 It is this 
influence that has made supply-side responses so different during the opioid crisis than 
those of the War on Drugs.  
This thesis concludes that while incompatible on the surface level, lenient policies 
towards drug users and towards pharmaceutical companies both reflect how the 
medicalization of American society has influenced the departure from the War on Drugs. 
The “medical model” of health care, which emphasizes drugs, medical treatment, and 
surgery is ingrained in society and the economy. It is this medical model that can explain 
the prominence and profits pharmaceutical companies has gained. It can further explain 
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why the instinctual response now is to remedy issues of addiction through public-health 
tactics.  
 This thesis concludes that for at least the immediate future, the medical model 
will continue to have greater influence over the creation of drug policies. This is 
especially so given the move away from mass incarceration. For this reason, change can 
only happen once our hyper-medicalized society addresses notions on pain management 
and the conflicting role Big Pharma has played in facilitating policy. 
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